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CHAPTER 6
Cashew Production, Taxation,
and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau
Boubacar-Sid Barry, Edward G. E. Creppy, and Quentin Wodon
Agriculture is the engine of Guinea-Bissau’s economy. The sector relies mainly
on cashew nuts, rice, and the subsistence production of food crops. Cashews
represent 90 percent of the country’s exports and the principal source of income
in rural areas. Unfortunately, cumbersome administrative arrangements,
weak legal systems, and an absence of credit often lead to high transaction
costs for cashew buyers and exporters, which help decrease the farm-gate price
of the raw nuts. This chapter provides a review of the cashew sector in Guinea-
Bissau, as well as estimates of the likely impact of changes in farm-gate prices
and export taxes on poverty among cashew producers and in the country as a
whole. The chapter also notes that over the last three decades, the production
of rice has signiﬁcantly decreased in favor of cashew farming. This situation
represents a threat to food security. For the rural sector to ensure food security
and create new jobs, policymakers would need to adopt a coherent agrarian
development strategy in the context of the PRSP, which would aim at rehabili-
tating and encouraging rice production, and also promoting the processing of
raw cashews into exportable cashew kernels, in order to generate more value
added in the cashew sector.
A
griculture has been for a long time the backbone of Guinea-Bissau’s economy as
the country is endowed with fertile soils, abundant water, and a favorable climate.
The sector represents more than half of the GDP, employs four-ﬁfths of the labor
force, and contributes to more than 90 percent of the country’s export earnings through
cashew nut exports. Over the past three decades, the production of cashew nuts has
increased substantially. Guinea-Bissau is now the sixth-largest producer of cashew nuts
(6 percent of the world cashew production) after India, Vietnam, Brazil, Ivory Coast, and
Tanzania.
While the cashew sector has had large positive macroeconomic impacts, and while it
is the main source of livelihood of many among the rural poor, it suffers from a number
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of weaknesses. First, as in the other economic sectors, public investments in agriculture
have stalled in recent years due the reallocation of public resources to defense and security
programs. The efﬁciency of the cashew sector has probably been affected by this lack of
investment, if only in terms of transport costs. Similarly, private investments suffered from
the lack of adequate ﬁnancing mechanisms, which is one of the reasons why Guinea-Bissau
produces and exports raw cashews instead of moving up the value chain. This situation
places the sector as well as cashew producers in a vulnerable condition vis-à-vis price ﬂuc-
tuations on the international markets, and the absence of a coherent rice-cashew strategy
represents a major threat to rice production and food security because the increase in
cashew production has been obtained at the detriment of rice production (there is in fact
a whole system of barter of cashew nuts for rice).
On a regulatory and administrative level, the cost of doing business in the cashew sector
also remains relatively high, as documented by Jaeger and Lynn (2004).27 Instability and
weak governance remain major disincentives for much-needed domestic and foreign
investments in the sector. This situation is further complicated by changing regulations,
unclear and cumbersome administrative requirements for existing and new businesses,
and dysfunctional legal enforcement as well as inadequate utilities and seaport systems. In
addition, the current export tax on cashew nuts (6 percent) is high relative to other export
taxes (typically at 2 percent), thereby having a negative effect on rural incomes.
The objective of this chapter is to provide a brief review of key issues in the cashew sec-
tor, as well as estimates of the potential impact on poverty of selected cashew policies. It is
found that an increase in farm-gate prices, which could be achieved through a reduction in
transaction and ﬁnancing costs, could help to reduce poverty. The same would likely be true
for a reduction in export taxes. In contrast, an increase in export taxes on raw cashew exports
in order to promote the creation of processing facilities could, at least in the short run, affect
farmers negatively. While all these results are not sufﬁcient to serve as a basis for policy rec-
ommendtions, they provide important insights into the economy of Guinea-Bissau.
Guinea-Bissau’s Cashew Sector: Brief Review
Livelihood of the Poor and Farm-gate Price
Guinea-Bissau is endowed with fertile soils, abundant water, and a favorable climate. Agri-
cultural production includes cashew nuts, rice and other cereals, fruits, ﬁshing, livestock,
and forestry products. Exports are, however, concentrated on cashew nuts, with only min-
imal additional revenues from ﬁsh and seafood, fruits, palm kernels, and timber. Started
as a marginal activity with an export volume of about 2,500 metric tons in the 1970s,
exports of cashew nuts have increased steadily during the past three decades, reaching over
80,000 metric tons by 2004. Today, the country is the sixth-largest producer of cashew nuts
(6 percent of the world production) after India, Vietnam, Brazil, the Ivory Coast, and Tan-
zania. Episodes of good cashew performance are often associated with higher per capita
incomes and better economic performance, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, suggesting a key
role for the sector in the economy.
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27. For further reference see Government of Guinea-Bissau (2004, 2005a, and 2005b) and Franca
(1994 and 1995).
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Figure 6.1 Real GDP and Cashew Production Volume, 1999–2003
(change in %)
Source: Authors using IMF and FAO data.
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As shown in Figure 6.2, an apparently positive feature of the cashew market in Guinea-
Bissau is the fact that farmers get a fairly high share of the export price, about 70 percent
according to Jaeger and Lynn (2004). This suggests that, within Guinea-Bissau, farmers
may get their fair share. However, cashews are provided to exporters by traders and inter-
mediaries who buy the crops from farmers, which are then exported to India for processing.
Due to the weakness of the banking sector in Guinea-Bissau, Indian ﬁrms often provide
ﬁnancing for exporters, and this is done on strict ﬁnancing terms, thereby putting downward
pressures on the prices paid to exporters and ultimately the farmers. As cited in Chapter 5,
Badji, a former minister of agriculture interviewed in December 2004, estimated that farm-
Cashew planting was ﬁrst established in the northern regions of Ohio and Biombo, and
expanded thereafter rapidly in the east and the south. According to estimates by ANAG
(quoted by Jaeger and Lynn 2004), about 5 percent of the country’s land or 175,000 hectares
are devoted to cashew production, and the land allocated to cashew nut production con-
tinues to grow today at a rate of about 4 percent per year. Due to the fact that many trees
planted in the recent past are bearing fruit, exports may very well reach up to 140,000 tons by
2010. Even more conservative estimates would lead to a level of exports above 100,000 tons
per year by 2010. Small farmers, most of whom are engaged in cashew production, com-
pose approximately 90,000 households with an average farm size per household of less than
3 hectares. Larger farmers or ponteiros, with land right concessions assigned by the govern-
ment, own some 2,200 properties covering 27 percent of the country’s arable land, with
each property ranging from 20 to 3,000 hectares.
ers may overall obtain only 20–30 percent of the full export value of cashews; with another
20–25 percent going to intermediaries, and a much larger 40–60 percent going to import
and export ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, in return for providing ﬁnancing, 70 percent of the share
allocated to exporters and importers may very well beneﬁt Indian importers rather than
exporters from Guinea-Bissau. The estimates provided by Badji are much less favorable than
those provided by Jaeger and Lynn (2004) regarding the transaction costs in the market
within Guinea-Bissau, and they also put the price received by the country’s exporters in
broader perspective. Said differently, farmers in the end may well beneﬁt from only a fairly
limited share of the actual value of their production on the world market.
Still, working in the sector is beneﬁcial for agricultural workers who are hired to col-
lect the crops and perform other work. Brushing, forest clearing, and planting are the pri-
mary activities required for establishing a cashew plantation. These activities are generally
carried out by unskilled laborers and can take 30 days of labor at a cost of 60,000 CFAF per
hectare ($110, estimates provided by Jaeger and Lynn 2004). Small farmers typically col-
lect their own production, while larger planters hire workers for the job. Jaeger and Lynn
(2004) suggest that about CFAF125 ($0.25) per kilogram is paid as labor costs during col-
lection (50 percent of the average farm-gate price per kg). If a worker gathers 35 kg/day of
nuts, he or she will earn CFAF 8,750 every four days, or 2,188 per day (about $4.50), which
is an attractive rural wage rate.
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Figure 6.2 Breakout of Cashew Export Costs
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Source: Jaeger and Lynn 2004, based on exporter interviews and government figures.
The more fundamental issue is that Guinea-Bissau essentially produces and exports
raw cashews, while the sector would generate much more value added if cashew nuts were
processed and conditioned before being exported. Another constraint facing the sector is the
absence of research and development, and vulgarization activities. Cashew trees are grown
naturally without using advanced scientific methods, while in other countries research
programs are carried out in order to improve the size of the nuts and their capacity to resist
deadly diseases such as the Fungi Anthracnose and Oidium Anacardii, which have already
affected plantations in Mozambique. So far, Guinea-Bissau has been fortunate as these
infections have not spread in the country, but risks remain.
The sector also remains vulnerable to price shocks and a decline in export prices over
time (see Figure 6.3), with a decline over time of the price of the commodity and adverse
price ﬂuctuation on the world markets translating into some volatility for cashew producers.
In addition, there is also volatility in cashew prices within a given year. For example, the farm
gate price was between 60–70 percent of the FOB value of the export price in 2004. Jaeger
and Lynn (2004) note that the price doubled during the ﬁrst weeks of the season, fell back
as the export buying price moved higher, and then dropped again because of increased
speculations on the side of the Indian exporters.
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Figure 6.3 Trend in Cashew Prices, 1979–2003
Source: Authors based on FAO data.
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In addition, as already mentioned above when discussing the prices received by
exporters, microﬁnance is too weak not only to ﬁnance the whole value-added chain but
also to ﬁnance other improvements in the sector. There is only one commercial bank in
Guinea-Bissau and nearly all banking activities are concentrated in the capital city, Bissau.
Commercial loans are limited to a few small enterprises in the form of short-term agricul-
tural working capital (crédit de campagne). Access to credit is very limited for the majority
of the population because of lack of collateral. Improving access to microﬁnance for small
holders could facilitate the diversiﬁcation of the sector and help create jobs.
Regulatory Framework, Transaction Costs, and Taxation28
Guinea-Bissau could develop a sizeable cashew processing industry that could create thou-
sands of jobs and earn a great deal of value added. However, the development of such an
28. This section is based in large part based on Jaeger and Lynn (2004).
industry requires both domestic and foreign investment. A study by Jaeger and Lynn
(2004) suggests that obstacles to such investments include a lack of adequate institutional
and regulatory arrangements, as well as high domestic and international transportation
costs due to poor rural road infrastructure and the small number of freight companies,
and, to a lower extent, taxation.
Consider ﬁrst the broad institutional and regulatory setting. Political instability and
weak governance have created major disincentives to domestic and foreign investments
necessary for the development of the sector. There are numerous risks associated with
changing regulations, unclear and cumbersome administrative requirements for existing
and new businesses, dysfunctional legal enforcement, and inadequate utilities and seaport
systems. Addressing these issues would require improving the investment climate (simpli-
fying and clarifying relevant laws and taxes, streamlining investment and export-related
administrative procedures, rehabilitating the physical and administrative infrastructure of
the port, and so forth).
In regard to the cashew sector speciﬁcally, laws concerning cashew nut trading have
changed often in recent history, including two changes in 2000 and another in 2001. The
laws are unclear, and the traders believe that enforcement may not always correspond to
what the laws say. For example, it is currently not clear whether foreign enterprises are per-
mitted to buy raw cashew nuts as intermediaries or exporters. Not only does this reduce
the competition for the nuts but the uncertainty is an unambiguous danger signal to
investors. When enforcement is believed to be contrary to the law, there must be recourse
through the courts, which requires an effective judicial system. In addition, the absence of
coordination between producers and other stakeholders, as well as the lack of supervision
on the government side also contribute to persistent weaknesses in the sector. Currently,
there is no private organization that encourages and sustains collaborative actions between
all parties involved in the cashew chain. Stakeholders in the cashew sector need to organize
themselves under a structure that they create to promote their mutual interests. On the
government side, a small ofﬁce dedicated to policies related to cashews could also be set up.
Another issue is the fact that transportation costs are relatively high, especially for exports
out of the country. The country does not have a railway system, and possesses only 10 per-
cent of paved roads in a network of 4,400 km. The road network in rural areas is generally
unpaved and in bad condition. The country has a large river transportation network yet to
be developed. Beyond the poor infrastructure within the country, the cost of freight to India
(a major importer of Guinea-Bissau’s cashew nuts for processing) is signiﬁcantly higher in
Guinea-Bissau than in other West African ports. The cost of a 20-foot container shipped from
Bissau to India was quoted as $1,400 in June 2004 (rising to $1,700 by late June), compared
with $600 from Abidjan. The higher costs are in part because of shipping line charges for
calling at Bissau ports and the absence of competition in Guinea-Bissau’s freight market.
Finally, taxation of the sector, although reduced over time, may still lead to some
negative trickle-down for farmers. Exports of cashew nuts are currently taxed at the rate of
6 percent (since 1989 this rate has been gradually reduced from 34 percent). The reduction
was intended to boost raw cashew export. However, the authorities may decide in the
future to promote cashew processing by raising rates in order to discourage raw cashew
exports. Although the overall net effect of such policy may be positive in the long run, it
could have a strong negative effect on rural incomes in the short term (as kernel processing
will take years to fully develop). If 80,000 tons are exported at $650 per ton, a 10 percent
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tax rise could equate to $5 million, a big part of which might in the end have to be borne
by farmers. Since farmers beneﬁt only from part of the export price, a 10 percent tax
increase at FOB level would be equivalent to a drop in revenues of at least 14 percent at the
farmer’s level under full pass-through. Thus, in the absence of a processing capacity, which
would lead to higher margins, a tax increase could penalize farmers and worsen poverty.
Impact of the Cashew Boom on Rice Production
Rice production represents a fundamental livelihood strategy for most of the rural popula-
tion in Guinea-Bissau, and is recognized as a priority in the Agrarian Development Policy
Charter. Rice accounts for 62 percent of the national cereal production and 75 percent of
actual cereal consumption equivalent to 130,000 tons per year or 130 kg per capita annu-
ally. Yet, domestic paddy rice production constitutes 77,000 tons of milled rice only. This
means that the country has faced a chronic rice production shortage of 45,000–60,000 tons
in recent years. The gap is ﬁlled by rice imports, which have represented about 25 percent,
or $13.4 million, of the trade account deﬁcit in recent years. This is in sharp contrast to the
production levels attained before independence, during the 1950s and 1960s, a time at
which production used to generate a surplus for export to neighboring countries in addition
to urban centers. In fact rice production had increased by more than 10 percent per year
even during the 1980s, largely because of improved economic incentives. But production
stalled following the cashew boom of the 1990s, due mainly to increased reallocation of
agricultural land and labor force to cashews (Figure 6.4).
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Figure 6.4 Cashew Nut Production, 1979–2003
(in metric tons)
Source: Authors based on FAO data.
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There are several reasons for the growth of the cashew sector to the detriment of
rice production. First, farmers are naturally inclined to engage in commercial crop pro-
duction of more guaranteed value. Second, cashew production also allows farmers to
reduce their production cost, especially in terms of labor inputs that are higher for rice
than cashews. Indeed, virtually no labor is required until nut harvesting after planting.
Thus new areas are increasingly converted into cashew plantations, especially in the
eastern and southern part of the country. Most of such newly established plantations
have yet to mature for fruit bearing, hence, as mentioned earlier, higher levels of pro-
duction are expected in the future. Third, another disincentive for rice production is 
its resale value. The local rice variety is not viewed favorably enough to give incentives
to engage surplus production beyond what would be necessary for subsistence needs for
a family.
The strategy of replacing a subsistence crop with a cash crop involves a major food
security risk. Farmers need to survive within what the rice harvest permits as it comes to a
close in September–October in the small valleys, or October–November in mangroves.
They have to wait for the cashew nuts to ripen for harvest in March/April through June
when barter transaction with rice is possible. Farmers’ subsistence rice stock often runs out
before such transaction is possible, leading to food security risks. This implies that cashew
producers exchange part of their production to obtain rice. These barter transactions
amount to CFAF 15 billion, or about $26 million based on local market value of raw cashew
nuts. Necessary investment to attain self-sufﬁciency in rice production would be less than
one-third of the costs paid in the barter system.
The rehabilitation and promotion of rice production is seen as essential for ensuring food
security and sustainable poverty reduction. Bringing rice production to pre-independence
levels would require the introduction of high-yield rice seeds, and the rehabilitation of
rural roads. Introducing new species of high-yield rice compatible with the country’s cli-
mate is one option. For example, the super ratooning rice brand developed in southeast
China’s Fujian Province can reach more than 16 tons per hectare per year. The species is
able to bear fruit twice a year, and exceeded the Chinese national acceptable criteria for
super hybrid rice. The high-yield rice may bring a higher yield and alleviate the heavy
labor otherwise required of farmers in Guinea-Bissau. If all actual land devoted to rice
production were cultivated using the type of rice described above, the country’s total pro-
duction of rice is likely to exceed 2.2 million tons per year in the long run. This would
allow covering domestic needs and still potentially generate more than 2 million tons for
exports. Achieving such a production capacity would of course require that farmers have
access to credit for buying fertilizers and other modern agrarian equipment for sowing,
maintaining and harvesting crops. It would also require good rural road networks in order
to ship goods to local and regional markets. The ﬁrst step toward planning such a change
would be to prepare a coherent agricultural development strategy in the context of the
PRSP, and reinforce rice production pilot phases currently being implemented in the
eastern regions of the country.
Distributional Issues in Cashew Production, Pricing, and Taxation
Basic Statistics from the 2005 IPSA Perceptions Survey
Household level data on cashew production are scarce. The nationally representative 2002
ILAP survey (INEC 2002, Sylla 2004) was to have a module on income sources, including
income from various crops, but information by crop is not actually available in the survey
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data ﬁles. Therefore, the only source of information available to conduct some distributional
analysis is a small-scale survey conducted in 2005 for the IPSA report on Guinea-Bissau by
the World Bank (World Bank 2006). The survey was conducted in both urban and rural
areas, with about 400 households participating.
Apart from general information on income sources, the 2005 IPSA survey includes
speciﬁc questions on cashew sales and barter. Summary statistics on the results are provided
in Table 6.1. Slightly more than a third of the households (37.4 percent) have positive
sales, with a higher proportion in the bottom tercile (46.5 percent) than in the top tercile
(26.1 percent). The proportion of households with positive cashew sales reaches close to
half among those household who declare having land, with smaller differences by tercile.
While poorer households are more likely to produce and sell cashews, the total value of the
sales is higher among wealthier households when the sample is restricted to those who sell
cashews. However, the differences are not very large in the sample, ranging from an average
sale value of about CFAF 121,000 in the bottom tercile to 176,000 in the top tercile. This
lack of difference may be because of the small scale of the survey, in which large producers
(ponteiros) are not likely to be well represented. Said differently, the sample is likely to
represent the situation of relatively small producers only, rather than the situation of all
producers in the country.
Another important result is the fact that exchange by barter (exchange of cashews for
rice) is very common, especially among the poorest tercile, where they represent 55.9 per-
cent of all transactions at the end of the season (and 73 percent of all transactions year-round).
In the top quintile, barter accounts for 39.3 percent of sales at the end of the season 
(59.4 percent year-round). This is probably because wealthier households have other
means to purchase rice, and prefer to sell their production in cash rather than in kind.
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Table 6.1 Cashew Sales by Tercile, 2005
Tercile (%) Area (%)
1 2 3 Urban Rural Total
Positive sale 46.5 39.4 26.1 28.9 42.8 37.4
Positive sale among 
those with land 50.4 47.0 43.6 50.6 46.4 47.6
Sales value when 
positive (CFAF) 120,924 147,540 176,189 170,292 131,332 143,020
Time of sale
Beginning of season 1.3 4.3 3.1 2.5 3.1 2.9
Mid-point of season 3.1 2.6 1.5 2.2 2.6 2.5
End of season 22.7 23.9 36.0 29.3 25.6 26.9
Time of barter
Beginning of season 5.3 10.6 12.2 11.8 7.7 9.2
Mid-point of season 11.8 7.1 7.9 7.1 10.0 9.0
End of season 55.9 51.5 39.3 47.1 51.0 49.6
Source: Authors from the 2005 Qualitative Survey.
Impact of Cashew Prices and Taxes on the Poor
Although the above data are fairly limited, they can nevertheless be used to perform indicative
simulations regarding the impact of cashew policies on poverty and inequality if we are
willing to make a number of assumptions and to combine these data with results obtained
from the nationally representative 2002 ILAP survey. Two types of simulations are performed.
First, we can assess the impact on poverty of an increase in the prices paid to producers,
thanks, for example, to a higher price obtained by exporters or through a reduction in
transaction and transport costs. Similarly, we can assess how a reduction or an increase in
the tax to be paid on cashew exports would affect the poor.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of changes in the farm-gate prices of cashews. Empirical evi-
dence worldwide suggests that improved access to markets through improved business
environments; better institutional, regulatory, and tax arrangements; and adequate rural
infrastructure may have a strong potential for reducing poverty. The speciﬁc discussion for
Guinea-Bissau in the previous section suggested that although farmers may receive a relatively
large share of the export price, the export price itself is low due in part to the unavailability
of ﬁnancing in the country. As exporters must rely on ﬁnancing provided by Indian ﬁrms
on strict terms, farmers ultimately suffer from low farm-gate prices.
The simulations in Table 6.2 provide a very rough idea of how poverty might evolve
among cashew producers if these producers were to receive a higher price for their crop. The
ﬁrst line in the table provides the value of household cashew production. For simplicity,
we will assume that the cashew producing households from the ﬁrst tercile of Table 6.2 in the
2005 IPSA survey are representative of the extreme poor who are cashew producers, while
households in the ﬁrst two terciles are representative of cashew producers who are either poor
or extreme poor. Thus, the average value of cashew production among the extreme poor is
estimated at CFAF 120,924 (from Table 6.1), while for the poor, the corresponding value is
the straight average of the value of the production for the two ﬁrst terciles in the 2005 IPSA
survey, namely CFAF 134,232. For poverty analysis, we need to transform these estimates into
estimates per equivalent adult, (each household member above 15 years of age counts for one
equivalent adult, while household members below that age count for only one half of an equiv-
alent adult, following the poverty measurement methodology used in the country). The esti-
mated numbers of equivalent adults in Table 6.2 are from the 2002 ILAP survey. Dividing
household cashew production value by the number of equivalent adults generates cashew
production value per equivalent adult, which can then be compared to the levels of total con-
sumption per equivalent adult in the 2002 ILAP survey in order to assess how consumption
per equivalent adult might evolve with an increase in revenues from cashew nuts (assuming
all the increase in revenues is used for consumption purposes by beneﬁciary households).
The results suggest that a 15 percent increase in farm-gate prices for cashew nuts could
result in an increase in consumption for the extreme poor of 9.5 percent, and 3.3 percent for
the poor. The results for the extreme poor are likely to be overestimated because the estimated
share of total per capita consumption accounted for by cashew nuts is large. On the other hand,
the very poor who are not cashew producers themselves but work on farms as day laborers
could beneﬁt from trickle-down effects which are not accounted for here. Next, taking into
account the measures of poverty and extreme poverty obtained in the 2002 ILAP survey, and
estimates of the elasticity of poverty reduction to an increase in consumption (which are
preliminary at this stage), we ﬁnd that among cashew producers, extreme poverty could be
reduced by 3.14 percentage points and poverty by 1.81 percentage point under a 15 percent
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increase in cashew prices. These are substantial impacts that result from the important role
that cashew revenues play among those households who produce and sell cashews. Finally, in
order to assess the potential poverty impact on poverty in the country as a whole, one must
take into account the fact that not all the poor or extreme poor are cashew producers. Even
though only about half of the households are likely to be involved in cashew produc-
tion and sales according to the 2005 IPSA survey, the net impact on national poverty remains
fairly large, with anticipated reductions in the share of the poor or extreme poor of 0.78 and
1.46 percentage points respectively. Note again that the estimates in Table 6.2 do not take into
account potential derived impacts through wage increases for cashew farm workers.
What about the impact on poverty of taxing cashew exports? An increase in the export
tax on unprocessed cashew nuts of about 10 percent could potentially (with full pass-
through to farmers) generate a reduction in their farm-gate price of close to 15 percent as
discussed in previously (this assumes that farmers get 70 percent of the export price).29
In other words, this would have equal, but reverse, effects on poverty as the estimates in
Table 6.2 (poverty could increase by the amounts estimated in Table 6.2). Alternatively, if
the 6 percent export tax were eliminated, and if we were again to assumer full pass-through
to farmers, farmers could beneﬁt from an increase in consumption of 8.6 percent, which
would have poverty impacts of about half the estimates presented in Table 6.2. The issue
of the impact on producers of changes in export taxes implies a difﬁcult dilemma, as an
increase in taxes to encourage exporters to move up the value chain toward cashew process-
ing may have short-term detrimental impacts on the poor. Yet in the medium- to long-term,
it could be hoped that the positive effect on income of cashew processing on producers
would more than offset the adverse short-term impact. If it were decided to increase export
taxes, a gradual increase in the tax rate could help to reduce short-run effects.
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Table 6.2 Impact of Change in Cashew Prices on Poverty
Impact on Impact on 
Assumptions poverty extreme poverty
Value of household cashew production (CFAF) 120,924 134,232
Household size (number of equivalent adults) 7.6 6.6
Per capita value of cashew production (CFAF) 15,911 20,338
Mean consumption/equivalent adult among the poor (CFAF) 25,152 91,895
Gain in consumption with 15% rise in cashew price (CFAF) 2,387 3,051
Headcount index of poverty/extreme poverty (%) 21.6 65.7
Elasticity of poverty reduction to consumption growth −1.53 −0.83
Change in consumption with 15% rise in cashew price (%) 9.5% 3.3%
Change in poverty among cashew producers (%) −14.5% −2.8%
Percentage point change in poverty among cashew producers −3.14 −1.81
Share of households producing cashew nuts (%) 46.5% 43.0%
Impact on poverty/extreme poverty among all households −1.46 −0.78
Source: Authors from 2002 ILAP and 2005 IPSA surveys.
29. See Diop and others (2005) for a similar case study on Rwanda.
Conclusion
Cashews represent 90 percent of the country’s exports and the principal source of income
in rural areas. Unfortunately, cumbersome administrative arrangements, weak legal systems,
and an absence of credit have led to high transaction costs which decrease the farm-gate
price of the raw nuts. This chapter has provided a review of the cashew sector in Guinea-
Bissau, as well as estimates of the likely impact of changes in farm-gate prices and export
taxes on poverty among cashew producers and in the country as a whole. The chapter has
noted that over the last three decades, the production of rice has decreased in favor of cashew
farming. According to some, this situation may represent a threat to food security. More
generally, for the rural sector to ensure food security and create new jobs, policymakers
would need to adopt a coherent agrarian development strategy in the context of the PRSP,
which could among others aim at rehabilitating and encouraging rice production, and also
promoting the processing of raw cashew into exportable cashew kernels in order to generate
more value added in the cashew sector.
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